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1. Introduction 
Recent metaphysics has seen much interest in grounding – a relation of non-causal determination 
whereby a fact obtains in virtue of the obtaining of some other fact or facts. One recurring and 
largely unquestioned assumption in the discussion is that grounding is, in some sense, a 
particularly intimate metaphysical relation. In this vein, for example, Kit Fine calls grounding 
“the ultimate form of explanation” (2001, 16). Another common, and arguably related, idea is that 
grounding has some necessary connection with the especially core features of things: their 
essences or natures (Audi (2012), section III). In this article, I will be concerned with these ideas 
about grounding. I believe that certain interesting and widespread philosophical views are 
committed to there being cases of metaphysically opaque grounding: grounding that constitutes a 
less than maximally intimate relation, among other things because it does not go together with 
any essence or nature connections. Thus, for example, a moral non-naturalist might want to hold 
that a particular action is morally right in virtue of instantiating certain natural properties, while 
denying that the essence or nature of moral rightness involves anything natural. I believe that the 
notion of metaphysically opaque grounding has been neglected in the literature, and that it has 
important and interesting consequences for how to think about grounding. I also believe that a 
view of grounding which allows for metaphysically opaque cases is defensible. 
My aims for this article are thus to introduce, spell out, and motivate interest in the general notion 
of metaphysically opaque grounding (section 2), demonstrate how opaque grounding has 
important consequences for our understanding of grounding and nearby phenomena (section 3), 
and to defend the possibility of opaque grounding from objections (section 4). 
2. Metaphysically Opaque Grounding 
In this section, I want to introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding. I will start by 
defining it, before moving on to motivate why the notion is interesting. 
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I’ll define opaque grounding with the help of three conditions. The first one is straightforward: 
GROUNDING: [P] (at least partially) grounds [Q]. 
Every case of opaque grounding is a case of grounding. I take grounding to be the relation that 
holds between facts when one fact obtains in virtue of the obtaining of the other(s). (I take a 
logically atomic fact to be the instantiation of a property by an entity, or the holding of a relation 
between entities.1 I follow the convention of forming names for facts by using square brackets: 
thus, “[x is F]” denotes the fact of x’s being F.)    
Two further, and less self-explanatory, conditions will be needed to define opaque grounding: 
IRREDUCIBILITY: [P] is not part of the metaphysical analysis of [Q]. 
ESSENTIAL ISOLATION: The essence of [Q] does not involve [P]. 
The ideology involved here takes some unpacking. When employing essentialist ideology, I intend 
it to be taken in the way rehabilitated by Kit Fine, where a condition φ’s being essential to x goes 
beyond φ’s merely being metaphysically necessary for x to exist.2 On that usage, φ’s being essential 
to x rather amounts to φ’s being part of what it is to be x, φ’s being part of the identity of x, or φ’s 
being part of the real definition of x. 
As for metaphysical analysis, I take it to apply in the first instance to properties and relations and 
by extension to facts. The metaphysical analysis of a property or relation F states which properties 
and/or relations F itself consists in. Suppose e.g. that being a vixen consists in being a fox and 
being female. The latter two properties then jointly make up the full metaphysical analysis of the 
property of being a vixen – being a vixen just is being a female fox. This then extends to facts in 
 
1 The assumption of grounding as a relation between facts is somewhat inessential here. I believe much of 
what follows applies, mutatis mutandis, to a framework where grounding is taken as a relation between true 
propositions – as per Bolzano ([1837] 2014) – or to one where grounding is treated by means of a sentential 
operator – see e.g. Fine (2012). 
2 See Fine (1994). 
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the obvious way: the facts [Red is female] and [Red is a fox] jointly make up the full metaphysical 
analysis of the fact [Red is a vixen].3  
Metaphysical analysis, like essence, goes beyond mere metaphysical modality. I take it that F’s 
fully consisting in G and H amounts to something more than that being G and H is necessary and 
sufficient for being F. I suggest we view metaphysical analysis as a structural or constructional 
notion – when G and H make up the full metaphysical analysis of property F, F is built out of G 
and H by some appropriate property-forming operation, and contains them as constituents (and 
mutatis mutandis for relations and facts).4   
Equipped with these pieces of ideology, I can now define the notion of metaphysically opaque 
grounding. Roughly speaking, [P] opaquely grounds [Q] just in case [P] and [Q] jointly satisfy 
GROUNDING, IRREDUCIBILITY, and ESSENTIAL ISOLATION. But we want to be able to apply the 
notion of opaque grounding in cases where several facts jointly ground another fact. We thus get 
the following: 
[P1], … , [PN] (fully) opaquely ground [Q] =df. 
(i) [P1], … , [PN] fully ground [Q]; and 
(ii) there is no fact f such that f is among [P1], … , [PN] and f is part of the metaphysical 
analysis or involved in the essence of [Q]. 
For convenience, I will also introduce a label for non-opaque, “standard” grounding. I will say that 
[P1], … , [PN] (fully) transparently ground [Q] just in case [P1], … , [PN] fully ground [Q], but do 
not fully opaquely ground [Q]. 
Why care about opaque grounding? Part of what makes opaque grounding interesting is the non-
standard picture of grounding that emerges if we take the notion seriously – something to be 
 
3 For similar ideas, see King (1998), Schroeder (2005), Skiles (2012, chap. 3), Rosen (2015), and Goff (2017, 
chap. 2). Note that although Goff and I both employ the expression “metaphysical analysis” and use it in 
similar ways, it should not be assumed that our conceptions of metaphysical analysis overlap completely. 
4 For something like this constructional view, see Skiles (2012, chap. 3), and Wilsch (2016, 3–4). 
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explored in section 3 below. A more straightforward use is that the notion of opaque grounding 
helps us capture the characteristic commitments of certain interesting metaphysical theories. I 
will now turn to explain how. 
I believe certain important metaphysical theories are implicitly committed to cases of opaque 
grounding. Explicitly articulating the notion enables us to better recognize what is distinctive 
about the metaphysical commitments of those theories. The paradigm example I will use is that 
of classical moral non-naturalism. Classical moral non-naturalism (or just “non-naturalism” for 
short) is a theory in metaethics that I will take, insofar as its metaphysics is concerned, to be 
characterized by two commitments.5 The first one is a claim about the natures of certain properties 
(I will here use moral rightness as the example): 
NATURE-COMMITMENT: The property of being morally right is a sui generis non-natural 
property whose nature does not involve any natural property. The property of being 
morally right is not reducible to or built out of any natural properties, and it lacks a real 
definition in terms of natural properties. 
This commitment emphasizes a kind of metaphysical separation or distinctness between the 
normative property of moral rightness and natural properties. In this vein, Pekka Väyrynen 
writes:  
[T]he non-naturalist thinks that at least some normative properties aren’t identical to 
any natural or supernatural properties, nor do they have a real definition, metaphysical 
reduction, or any other such tight metaphysical explanation wholly in terms of natural 
or supernatural properties. (2018, 171) 
 
5 The metaethical literature contains a variety of different versions of moral non-naturalism, which can vary 
considerably in their metaphysics. Though I will, for brevity, often talk about “moral non-naturalism” 
unqualifiedly, I only claim that a specific form of moral non-naturalism (one that I believe, however, to be 
both historically and contemporaneously influential) is committed to opaque grounding. 
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But moral non-naturalists also want to affirm a certain kind of connection between rightness 
in actions and select natural properties of those actions. More precisely, they are committed 
to: 
EXPLANATION-COMMITMENT: Instantiations of the property of being morally right are 
explained by instantiations of natural properties. Whenever a token action a instantiates 
moral rightness, it does so because it instantiates some natural property – say e.g. the 
property of being happiness-maximizing. When a is morally right, this is in virtue of its 
being happiness-maximizing; a’s being happiness-maximizing makes it morally right.  
This view (or at least an analogue applied to moral goodness) is endorsed by G. E. Moore, the key 
figure in analytic non-naturalism, when pushed by C. D. Broad to clarify his position: 
[I] should never have thought of suggesting that goodness was “non-natural,” unless I 
had supposed that it was “derivative” in the sense that, whenever a thing is good […] its 
goodness (in Mr. Broad’s words) “depends on the presence of certain non-ethical 
characteristics” possessed by the thing in question: I have always supposed that it did 
so “depend,” in the sense that, if a thing is good (in my sense), then that it is so follows 
from the fact that it possesses certain natural intrinsic properties, which are such that 
from the fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those properties. 
(1942, 588)6 
Thus, something like EXPLANATION-COMMITMENT is assumed already in the paradigm example of 
moral non-naturalism in analytic philosophy. 
Since logically atomic facts are just instantiations of properties or relations, EXPLANATION-
COMMITMENT straightforwardly entails an instance of GROUNDING, namely that [a is happiness-
maximizing] grounds [a is morally right]. And since facts are partially built out of properties and 
 
6 It might be worth stressing that in light of Moore’s famous commitment to the indefinability of “good”, his 
usage of “follows” here cannot be interpreted as denoting logical or analytic entailment but is more plausibly 
intended to express an explanatory connection. 
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relations, NATURE-COMMITMENT, which is formulated as a claim about properties, strongly 
supports certain commitments at the level of facts too. If the property of being morally right is not 
reducible to or built out of any natural properties and lacks a real definition in terms of any 
natural property, then the same should go for the relation between [a is morally right] and natural 
facts. A motivating impulse behind moral non-naturalism is the idea that the nature of moral 
reality is profoundly different from that of natural reality. It would make for a strange position to 
insist that moral properties are irreducible to natural properties, citing the typical non-naturalist 
considerations, while somehow accepting moral facts (instantiations of moral properties or 
relations) as consisting fully in natural facts. That combination of views would not do justice to 
the core motivations behind non-naturalism. Thus, any moral non-naturalist embracing 
IRREDUCIBILITY should similarly accept that [a is morally right] neither has a real definition in 
terms of, nor is reducible to, nor built out of, [a is happiness-maximizing]. In other words: classical 
moral non-naturalists are committed to [a is happiness-maximizing] opaquely grounding [a is 
morally right]. 
I think moral non-naturalism of this kind is a good example of an interesting metaphysical view 
that is committed to opaque grounding. You might, of course, think moral non-naturalism is false 
– perhaps because you’re a naturalist who denies that there are any non-natural properties or 
facts, or because you’re a moral nihilist who denies that there are any moral properties or facts 
whatsoever. But, firstly, non-naturalism is a popular theory in contemporary metaethics. And, 
secondly, whatever problems that kind of view faces, there does not seem to be anything obviously 
wrong with its grounding commitments, as they have been laid out above. This gives us reason to 
take the idea of opaque grounding seriously and explore its consequences.7 (In section 4 below, I 
will consider arguments to the effect that the idea of opaque grounding is somehow confused.) 
 
7 Thus far, opaque grounding has been underexplored in the grounding literature. Rosen (2010, 130–33), 
discusses cases of opaque grounding under the monicker “Moorean connections”. Rosen’s discussion, 
however, is heavily centred around the issue of what grounds grounding facts themselves. Goff (2017) 
suggests that we interpret Moore’s moral metaphysics as committed to “a non-constitutive grounding 
relation, in which [sic] the facts about goodness are grounded in but ontologically additional to the non-
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However, I do not think moral non-naturalism is the only interesting position committed to opaque 
grounding. Most straightforwardly, there are analogous non-naturalist views about other kinds of 
normative properties and facts that seem helpfully explicable in terms of opaque grounding. An 
aesthetic non-naturalist may well take beauty to be a sui generis, unbuilt property lacking a real 
definition in terms of natural properties, but still think that instantiations of that property must 
be grounded in instantiations of natural properties. Such an aesthetician would be taking [o is 
beautiful] to be opaquely grounded in whatever fact makes o beautiful. But theories committed to 
opaque grounding do not necessarily have to deal with the normative. For example, a set of 
metaphysical commitments structurally analogous to those of moral non-naturalism has some 
prime facie appeal in the philosophy of mind. For on the one hand, it is natural to think that 
phenomenal properties and physical properties have fundamentally different kinds of internal 
natures and essences. On the other hand, it is attractive to rule out the possibility of “zombie 
worlds” where creatures physically indiscernible from us exist without any phenomenal activity. 
Equipped with a notion of opaque grounding, a property dualist can take phenomenal properties 
to necessarily be instantiated in virtue of instantiations of physical properties, while 
simultaneously taking the natures of the two kinds of properties to be so radically different that 
no physical property ever figures in the metaphysical analysis or essence of any phenomenal 
property. 8 Possessing a developed theory of opaque grounding allows us to articulate what sets 
this kind of dualism apart both from physicalist grounding views about the phenomenal as well 
as from more radical Cartesian forms of dualism.  
Admittedly, all the potential cases of opaque grounding mentioned so far are controversial. For 
one potential example of opaque grounding that is widely recognized in the literature (though not 
widely recognized as involving opaque grounding), consider grounding in mereological cases. Let 
“a” name the table in front of me, and “b1”, “b2”, … “bn” name its parts. Many philosophers think 
 
normative facts.” (p.43) However, Goff quickly sets the idea of “non-constitutive” grounding to the side 
without exploring its consequences or assessing its viability.  (In section 3.1. below, I turn to the relation 
between opaque grounding and the idea that grounding is “constitutive explanation.”) 
8 Rosen (2010, 132) mentions a similar example as an instance of what he calls “Moorean connections”. 
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facts about the existence and arrangement of b1-bn ground facts like [a exists], as well as facts 
about the properties of a. But it does not seem very plausible that the essence or metaphysical 
analysis of [a exists] or of (for example) [a weighs 6 kilograms] should involve any facts about the 
existence or arrangement of b1-bn. If this is right, we are here dealing with a grounding claim that 
is widespread, largely uncontroversial, and which (if true) constitutes an example of opaque 
grounding. At any rate, it should be clear that the general idea of metaphysically opaque 
grounding is a theoretically interesting option even outside the metaphysics of normativity. 
3. Consequences 
In this section, I want to draw attention to some ways in which the idea of opaque grounding 
affects widespread views about grounding and related topics. These consequences further 
illustrate the importance of the question of whether there is any opaque grounding. 
3.1. Grounding and Constitutive Metaphysical Explanations 
The first consequence concerns how close the relationship between a grounded fact and its grounds 
needs to be. It is an influential but rarely discussed idea that grounding constitutes a maximally 
strict or intimate explanatory connection between facts. I will call this the idea that grounding is 
constitutive explanation.9 In the following, I will articulate the core components of the idea, and 
argue that if there is opaque grounding, grounding cannot (always) be constitutive explanation. 
3.1.1. Constitutive Explanation 
It is a recurring theme in the grounding literature that one (or indeed the) characteristic feature 
of grounding is how strict or close a connection it is. Due to this, a correct grounding explanation 
is supposed to provide a form of understanding and illumination which is simply not attainable in 
 
9 Fine (2012, 37) writes, with reference to grounding, that ”I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea 
of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’.” Litland (2013, 20) writes “What's in question [in 
metaphysical explanation or grounding] is constitutive explanation”. Dasgupta (2016, 381) talks of 
“grounding explanation – otherwise known as metaphysical or constitutive explanation”. 
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other kinds of explanations.10 This renders grounding explanations particularly satisfactory and 
desirable in theorizing about the world. This idea is articulated in the following way by Kit Fine: 
We may call an in-virtue claim a statement of ontological or metaphysical ground when 
the conditional [“Necessarily, if P then Q”] holds of metaphysical necessity and I shall 
talk, in such cases, of the antecedent fact or facts grounding or being a ground for the 
consequent fact. […] Just as metaphysical necessity is the strictest form of necessity (at 
least as compared to natural and normative necessity), so it is natural to suppose that 
statements of metaphysical ground are the strictest form of in-virtue-of claim. In the 
other cases, we may sensibly ask for a stricter or fuller account of that in virtue of which 
a given fact holds. So in the case of the particle [“Necessarily, if the particle is acted upon 
by some positive force then it is accelerating”], for example, we may agree that the 
particle is accelerating in virtue of being acted upon by a positive force but think that 
there is some kind of gap between the explanans and explanandum which could – at 
least in principle – be filled by a stricter account of that in virtue of which the 
explanandum holds. But if we were to claim that the particle is accelerating in virtue of 
increasing its velocity over time (which is presumably a statement of metaphysical 
ground), then we have the sense that there is – and could be – no stricter account of that 
in virtue of which the explanandum holds. We have as strict an account of the 
explanandum as we might hope to have. […] If there is a gap between the grounds and 
what is grounded, then it is not an explanatory gap. (Fine 2012, 38–39) 
 
10 There is a question in the grounding literature of whether we should think of grounding as a relation that 
backs metaphysical explanations or as itself identical with metaphysical explanation. (For the former 
approach, see e.g. Schaffer (2016b); for the latter, see e.g. Fine (2012)). In this section, I ignore the details of 
this debate for reasons of convenience and move freely between talk of “grounding” and talk of “grounding 
explanation”. I believe nothing of substance in the discussion of the section hinges on this.    
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Elsewhere, Fine writes that grounding is distinguished from other explanatory connections “by 
being the tightest such connection” (2001, 15). These formulations articulate one crucial part of 
the idea that grounding is constitutive explanation: 
ULTIMACY: If [P1], ... , [PN] (fully) ground [Q], there is no “explanatory gap" between [P1], 
... , [PN] and [Q], and [Q] is thereby given the strictest form of explanation possible. 
Since the full ground of a fact need not logically or analytically entail the grounded fact, the talk 
of explanatory gaps in this context should not be understood merely in terms of logical or 
conceptual notions. What’s in question here is rather (the absence of) some metaphysical 
explanatory gap. But how are we to understand this?  
The supposed power of grounding to bridge metaphysical explanatory gaps, I suggest, is closely 
connected with another aspect of constitutive explanation. It is here helpful to focus on how Fine, 
in the passage quoted above, contrasts the strictness of grounding explanation with that of causal 
explanation. The particle’s being acted upon by some positive force causally (or naturally) explains 
the particle’s accelerating, but this explanation is not maximally strict, and leaves the relevant 
kind of explanatory gap open. The (grounding) explanation of the particle’s accelerating in terms 
of its increasing its velocity over time, however, is maximally strict, and closes the explanatory 
gap. The key to this difference is that in a constitutive explanation, the explanandum fact consists 
in nothing more than the explanans. Hence Fine writes: 
[T]he relation of ground is distinguished from [other explanatory connections] by being 
the tightest such connection.  Thus when the truth of P causally explains the truth of Q, 
we may still maintain that the truth of Q consists in something more (or other) than the 
truth of P. (2001, 15) 
Even though being acted upon by some positive force makes the particle accelerate, the former is 
not what the particle’s accelerating consists in, or what it is. So even though we can successfully 
explain, and thus come to understand, why the particle accelerates by citing its being acted upon 
by some positive force, this explanation still leaves an important gap in our understanding of the 
relevant fact. We can know what causes the fact to obtain without knowing its deeper inner nature 
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– what it consists in and really is. When we have a successful grounding explanation of the 
particle’s accelerating in terms of its increasing its velocity over time, by contrast, we possess an 
explanation that proceeds by specifying wherein the fact consists. In such a case, understanding 
why the fact obtains goes hand in hand with understanding what the fact is, wherein it consists. 
This, I take it, is the basic idea that underlies both the label “constitutive explanation”, and (more 
importantly) the thesis that grounding is the strictest and most intimate explanatory connection 
possible (i.e. the thesis of ULTIMACY). The idea is captured by the following principle: 
CONSTITUTION: If [P1], … [PN] (fully) ground [Q], [Q] consists in nothing more than [P1], 
… [PN].11 
An important corollary to ULTIMACY and CONSTITUTION is that there is a straightforward 
connection between grounding and the highly coveted status of one fact’s being “nothing over and 
above” some other facts. It is a popular idea in the grounding literature that when [P] (fully) 
grounds [Q], [Q] is nothing over and above [P], and therefore constitutes a theoretical “free 
lunch”.12 On the face of it, it’s unclear why this should be so. By the irreflexivity of grounding, [P] 
and [Q] are non-identical whenever one grounds the other, so a grounded fact is always something 
numerically additional to its grounds. Furthermore, explanation in general does not seem to 
secure “nothing over and above”-ness. Even if the window’s shattering has a full (causal) 
explanation in terms of Cicero’s throwing a rock against it (plus the necessary background 
conditions), the explanandum fact is clearly something “over and above” its explanantia. The key 
would seem to lie precisely in the supposed strictness of grounding, qua constitutive explanation. 
Thus Fine writes: 
 
11 Litland (2013, 20) writes “What's in question is constitutive explanation: if ψ grounds φ then its being the 
case that φ consists in its being the case that ψ.” Fine (2012) clearly embraces the connection between 
constitutive explanation and consisting in in further passages: “[I]t is natural in [cases of grounding 
explanation] to say that the explanans or explanantia are constitutive of the explanandum, or that the 
explanandum's holding consists in nothing more than the obtaining of the explanans or explanantia.” (p.39) 
12 See e.g. Schaffer (2009, 361), Sider (2015, 192). 
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[Ground] is the ultimate form of explanation; and it is perhaps for this reason that we 
are not inclined to think of the truth of a grounded proposition as a further fact over and 
above its grounds […]. (2001, 16)  
As we have seen, constitutive grounding explanation – by contrast with e.g. causal explanation – 
proceeds by identifying wherein the explanandum fact consists. Since this relation between 
explanandum and explanantia is supposed to close any metaphysical explanatory gap, it would 
seem appropriate to think of it as the tightest and most intimate connection short of numerical 
identity. If anything other than strict identity can secure the status of “nothing over and above”, 
constitutive explanation would seem to be it. 
Taking a step back to consider the larger picture, the idea of grounding as constitutive explanation 
is undeniably attractive. On this picture, a grounded fact always consists in its grounds. This 
metaphysically highly intimate relation of consisting in guarantees that the grounded and its 
grounds are so closely linked that the grounding connection between them constitutes the 
“ultimate form of explanation”, where no stricter explanation is even possible. This maximal 
closeness between the grounded and its grounds finally allows us to treat the former as “nothing 
over and above” the latter, thus securing various theoretical benefits. 
3.1.2. Opaque Grounding vs. Constitutive Explanation 
I will now argue that if there is opaque grounding, this alluring picture of grounding cannot be 
right – it depicts, at best, a mere part of the landscape. If there are opaque grounding cases, none 
of the principles outlined above hold in full generality, and consequently, not all cases of grounding 
are cases of constitutive explanation. 
Let us start with CONSTITUTION. Suppose that [a is happiness-maximizing] opaquely grounds [a 
is morally right], as on our now familiar form of moral non-naturalism. It then seems that the 
latter fact does consists in something more than the former. Clearly, [a is morally right]’s 
obtaining is explained by the obtaining of [a is happiness-maximizing], on the view in question. 
But as we have already seen, not just any explanatory relationship between facts suffices for one 
fact to consist in nothing more than another. For instance, a caused fact does not consist in its 
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causal explanantia taken together. One relation that clearly does suffice is metaphysical analysis: 
since being a vixen simply consists in being female and being a fox, [Red is a vixen] consists in 
nothing more than [Red is female] and [Red is a fox] jointly. It also seems plausible that certain 
relations (though it is hard to say precisely which) of essential involvement between facts would 
suffice for consisting in: if [Q] has the right kind of real definition in terms of [P1] … [PN], then [Q] 
consists in nothing more than [P1] … [PN]. But both these kinds of relations are ruled out by the 
non-naturalist. According to her view, the natural property instantiated in the ground is neither 
part of the metaphysical analysis nor part of the essence of the moral property instantiated in the 
grounded fact. Perhaps there are further relations that would suffice for one fact to consist in 
nothing more than another, but it is hard to see any natural sense in which (according to moral 
non-naturalism) the opaquely grounded fact [a is morally right] could consist in nothing more than 
[a is happiness-maximizing]. Thus, CONSTITUTION is false if there is opaque grounding. 
ULTIMACY is equally hard to square with opaque grounding. When [a is happiness-maximizing] 
opaquely grounds [a is morally right], the explanatory situation is much the same as in causal 
cases. The non-naturalist can rightly claim to have provided an explanation of why [a is morally 
right] obtains – on her view, it obtains because [a is happiness-maximizing] obtains. But she is 
not offering that explanation as an account of wherein [a is morally right] consists. Indeed, she is 
explicitly refusing to give any account of wherein the moral fact consists, since she takes the 
property of being morally right to be an absolutely fundamental property. On her view, there is 
nothing further in which the property of moral rightness consists, and correspondingly, there is 
nothing further in which the fact [a is morally right] consists either. Thus, her grounding 
explanation of [a is morally right] in terms of [a is happiness-maximizing] is not of the strictest 
form possible. An account which proceeded by identifying grounds wherein [a is morally right] 
consisted would be stricter. But just like in a causal explanation, the opaque grounding 
explanation provides us with an account of why the explanandum fact obtains without 
illuminating the deeper inner nature of that fact, wherein it consists, or what it is. The 
metaphysical explanatory gap that constitutive explanation would close remains open despite our 
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access to the full grounds of the fact. This shows that if there are cases of opaque grounding, 
ULTIMACY cannot be true. 
As one would expect in light of the preceding, the alleged connection between grounding and the 
notion of being “nothing over and above” some facts is also severed in opaque grounding cases. In 
such a case, the ground features neither in the essence nor in the metaphysical analysis of the 
grounded fact. As we have seen, this means that [Q] consists in something more than [P], and that 
there is an explanatory gap between the two, since [Q] has not been given the strictest possible 
kind of explanation. It is then exceedingly hard to see how committing to [Q] could carry no further 
theoretical cost than merely committing to [P] does. This is made vivid by considering the go-to 
example of opaque grounding. If moral rightness really is a fundamental property, the 
metaphysical analysis and essence of which does not involve happiness-maximization in any way, 
then [a is morally right] must be something over and above [a is happiness-maximizing]. 
Committing to the relevant opaque grounding claim involves committing to the existence and 
instantiation of a further property than merely committing to [a is happiness-maximizing] does – 
a moral property the nature and essence of which do not involve happiness-maximization. This 
non-naturalist metaphysics is supposed to be a paradigm example of an ontologically inflationary 
view on which moral facts are something “over and above” natural facts. If such a view could be 
combined with the idea that [a is morally right] is a “free lunch” relative to [a is happiness-
maximizing], then clearly anything goes when theory-constructing with the help of grounding. So, 
plausibly, opaque grounding does not give us cases of one fact being “nothing over and above” its 
grounds. 
3.1.3. Upshots 
I have argued that opaque grounding is in conflict with the two principles that characterize the 
idea that grounding is constitutive explanation. If there is opaque grounding, CONSTITUTION and 
ULTIMACY both fail as universal claims about grounding. The attractive picture of grounding 
outlined above then cannot do full justice to the facts. A different picture emerges instead. On this 
picture, grounding does not automatically guarantee the most intimate connection imaginable 
between facts, flowing through their inner natures and rendering the grounded fact ontologically 
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innocent. In some cases, grounding instead looks more like the looser connection of causation. 
Much like causation, opaque grounding does not illuminate the identity of the explanandum (what 
that fact is and wherein it consists), nor does it make for any “ontological free lunch”. In such 
cases, grounding simply backs an explanation of why one fact obtains in terms of the obtaining of 
another – just like causation.13 
A further consequence of the preceding concerns how grounding interacts with modality. If 
grounding were without exception constitutive explanation, a given fact could not differ in its 
grounds between different possible worlds. This is a consequence of the following plausible 
principle: 
NECESSARY CONSTITUTION: If [Q] consists in nothing more than [P1], … [PN], then 
necessarily, if [Q] obtains, then [P1], … [PN] obtain.   
Consider e.g. [Red is a vixen], and suppose it consists in nothing more than [Red is a fox], [Red is 
female] jointly. A fact cannot obtain unless everything wherein it consists also obtains. So [Red is 
a vixen] simply couldn’t obtain unless [Red is a fox] and [Red is female] both obtain.14 Given the 
 
13 For treatments of grounding that emphasize other aspects of similarity with causation, see Schaffer 
(2016b), Wilson (2018b). Shaheen (2017) argues that our concept of metaphysical explanation is derived from 
the concept of causal explanation via metaphorical extension. 
14 This raises a potential worry about my interpretation of Fine’s talk of “constitutive explanation”. Fine, like 
most friends of grounding, believes that disjunctive facts are grounded in their obtaining disjuncts and that 
existentially generalized facts are grounded in their witnessing facts. But of course Fine knows that the very 
same disjunctive or existentially generalized fact can have completely different grounds in different worlds! 
There are two different ways of going here that both seem defensible to me. The first one is to maintain 
Necessary Constitution as it stands, and insist that Fine simply has not consistently applied his conception 
of constitutive explanation when treating disjunctive and existentially generalized facts. (Doing so would 
involve denying that a disjunctive fact or existentially generalized fact is constitutively explained by the 
relevant disjunct or witness.) The second one is to qualify Necessary Constitution so that it does not apply to 
disjunctive and existentially generalized facts. This would not necessarily be ad hoc, since disjunctive and 
existentially generalized facts are special types of facts containing particular logical constituents (disjunction 
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common assumption that only obtaining facts exist, this amounts to a form of ontological 
dependence between [Red is a vixen] and its grounds – it is metaphysically impossible for the fact 
to exist without its grounds.15 
However, since an opaquely grounded fact’s obtaining does not consist in the obtaining of its 
grounds, a case of opaque grounding need not be accompanied by any such relation of ontological 
dependence. In such a case, there may yet be ontological dependence. For example, a moral non-
naturalist may hold that being happiness-maximizing is the only possible right-making property 
of actions. She will then be committed to the view that [a is morally right] cannot exist unless [a 
is happiness-maximizing] exists (given the assumption that only obtaining facts exist). But in that 
case, the commitment stems from her normative theory rather than from the metaphysics of 
grounding. And on other moral theories incorporating opaque grounding claims, [a is morally 
right] does not depend ontologically on any of its grounds. A moral non-naturalist may e.g. believe 
that there are distinct and independent properties F1, … FN, instantiations of which each suffice 
to make an action morally right. In that case, [a is morally right] may actually be grounded in [a 
is F1] while being possibly grounded in any one of [a is F1] … [a is FN]. On this scenario, [a is 
morally right] does not ontologically depend on any of the facts [a is F1], … , [a is FN] individually. 
This constitutes a further similarity between opaque grounding and causation. Even if [a is G] 
causes [a is H], the latter fact typically could have had a different cause, since the the effect does 
not consist in the cause (even together with the relevant background conditions). In cases of non-
constitutive grounding explanations, we can get the same kind of modal behavior. Thus, by 
severing the supposed link between grounding and constitutive explanation, we allow more 
theoretical options for philosophers who employ a notion of grounding. 
 
and the existential quantifier, respectively). It is not implausible that these logical constituents contribute 
to the facts they enter into in such a way that the facts in question are exempt from the typical link between 
the consisting in relation and modality. 
15 Tahko & Lowe (2016, §2) refer to this as “rigid existential dependence”. For discussions of the general 
relation between grounding and ontological dependence, see Schnieder (2017), Rydéhn (2018). 
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3.2. Opaque Grounding and Fundamentality 
In this section, I will argue that if there is opaque grounding, this has interesting consequences 
for how we should think about the relation between grounding and fundamentality.  
3.2.1. Opaque Grounding, Constituency and Fundamentality-Inducing Relations 
Philosophers have long made appeal to a notion of priority, or relative metaphysical 
fundamentality. But it is an increasingly popular view in recent metaphysics that patterns of 
fundamentality are never brute, but are explained by facts involving grounding and possibly other 
relations of metaphysical explanation or “construction”.16 (Let us call such relations, whichever 
they may be, fundamentality-inducing relations. Possible candidates beyond grounding include 
e.g. relations like composition and constitution.). Thus e.g. all friends of grounding accept that if 
[P] grounds [Q], then [P] is more fundamental than [Q] – and though it is rarely explicitly stated, 
it is natural to think that in such a case, [P] is more fundamental than [Q] because the former 
grounds the latter. Strikingly, however, there is one way in which grounding and relative 
fundamentality differ: whereas grounding is most commonly taken to be a relation exclusively 
between facts (an approach I have followed in this article), relative fundamentality often holds 
cross-categorically.17 So one might think e.g. that the concrete individual Caesar is more 
fundamental than his singleton set {Caesar}, or that the numbers 3 and 4 and the successor 
relation are all more fundamental than the fact [4 is the successor of 3]. This raises the question 
of how grounding relates not only to fundamentality itself, but also to the other fundamentality-
inducing relations. 
A natural thought is that grounding is in a certain way constrained by other fundamentality-
inducing relations. For when we consider various cases of grounding, there seems to be a 
systematic pattern at work: it seems that we only have grounding between facts when we have 
 
16 See e.g. Jenkins (2013), Bennett (2017). 
17 Most philosophers who deviate from this do so by taking grounding to be a relation between true 
propositions (see e.g. Bolzano ([1837] 2014), Fine (2001), Rosen (2010)), or by treating grounding by means 
of a sentential  operator (see e.g. Fine (2012)). The only notable treatment of grounding as a cross-categorial 
relation is found in (some of) the work of Jonathan Schaffer (see e.g. Schaffer (2009)). 
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other fundamentality-inducing relations between constituents of those facts. Thus, e.g. [Caesar 
exists] grounds [{Caesar} exists], and there is also an object-level connection: Caesar forms the set 
{Caesar}, whereby the man is more fundamental than the set. [Red is a fox] and [Red is female] 
together ground [Red is a vixen], and there is a corresponding relation between the properties 
involved in the facts. Being a fox and being female jointly make up (what I have called) the full 
metaphysical analysis of being a vixen, so that the former two properties are more fundamental 
than the latter. For a final example, consider the way in which some appropriate combination of 
facts about the existence and arrangements of particles a1-aN ground [Bo exists] (where Bo is the 
badger outside in the park). This grounding relation between facts too correlates with a 
metaphysical connection between constituents of the facts, for a1-aN are more fundamental than 
Bo by composing him.  
Cases like these make the following principle seem compelling: 
CONSTITUENCY: Necessarily, if [P1], … [PN] fully ground [Q], then there are entities x1, 
… xN and y such that x1, … xN are constituents of [P1], … [PN] and y is a constituent of 
[Q], and x1, … xN stand in some fundamentality-inducing relation to y. 
Various philosophers in the literature have defended positions which commit them to 
CONSTITUENCY or something much like it. One example is Tobias Wilsch (2015; 2016), who defends 
a deductive-nomological analysis of grounding, and a constructional conception of metaphysical 
laws. On the deductive-nomological analysis, grounding just is determination in accordance with 
metaphysical laws. On the constructional conception of metaphysical laws, all metaphysical laws 
involved in grounding govern the behavior of construction relations – relations whereby “the 
constructing entities are more basic than the constructed entity, and the constructed entities exist 
in virtue of the constructing entities” (Wilsch 2015, 3300). Wilsch’s notion of a construction 
relation can thus plausibly be taken as equivalent to my notion of a fundamentality-inducing 
relation. The deductive-nomological analysis and the constructional conception of metaphysical 
laws together entail that whenever [P1], … [PN] ground [Q], there is some construction relation 
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holding between some constituent(s) of the grounds and some constituent(s) of the grounded fact 
– i.e., they together entail CONSTITUENCY.18 
For another example, consider Kelly Trogdon (2018)’s attempt at illuminating grounding by 
connecting it to the idea of grounding mechanisms. Trogdon informally characterizes grounding 
mechanisms as “determination relations of a certain sort holding between constituents of 
grounding facts and constituents of the facts they ground”, and cites (among others) set formation, 
constitution, the determinate-determinable relation, and functional realization as examples of 
such determination relations (Trogdon 2018, 1290). Given the plausible assumption that 
determining entities render determined entities less fundamental, Trogdon’s determination 
relations are, in my terminology, all fundamentality-inducing relations. (He does not explicitly 
discuss the connection between determination relations and fundamentality.) The idea is then 
that many metaphysical explanations provide understanding of their target phenomenon by 
appealing to a specific grounding mechanism and thereby demonstrating “how the grounding 
connection runs.” Trogdon stops short of asserting that every case of grounding involves some 
grounding mechanism, and leaves open the possibility of “bare grounding” unmediated by any 
determination relation. However, he seems to believe that the plausible examples of bare 
grounding would be cases of grounding within the logical or conceptual domain, and expresses 
sympathy for the idea that in such cases, we are not really dealing with metaphysical grounding 
(Trogdon 2018, 1295; 2018, 1301–2). Trogdon’s view, at least when restricted to non-logical cases, 
thus seems very close to embracing CONSTITUENCY. 
We have seen both that CONSTITUENCY possesses some prima facie intuitive appeal, and that, 
arguably, some philosophers have been committed to it. However, if there are the right kind of 
opaque grounding cases, CONSTITUENCY cannot be right. To see why, return to our go-to example 
of opaque grounding. On the non-naturalist view of moral rightness, the fact [a is morally right] 
is fully grounded in [a is happiness-maximizing]. At the same time, the non-naturalist holds that 
 
18 This is not surprising, as CONSTITUENCY is similar to the “Ground to Constituent” principle which Wilsch 
(2015, 3296–97) suggests a plausible analysis of grounding should entail and explain. 
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the property of moral rightness is itself not reducible to or built out of any natural property or 
properties, including the property of being happiness-maximizing. Rather, she will think that the 
property of being morally right is an absolutely fundamental property, not metaphysically 
constructed out of anything else. Consequently, her grounding claim will be inconsistent with 
CONSTITUENCY. [a is happiness-maximizing] fully grounds [a is morally right] on her view, but 
there are no fundamentality-inducing relations connecting the constituents of the two facts. Those 
constituents are the token action a, the property of being happiness-maximizing, the action a 
(again), and the property of being morally right. Clearly, a cannot stand in a fundamentality-
inducing relation to itself, since that would render a more fundamental than itself and thus violate 
the irreflexivity of relative fundamentality. And since moral rightness is supposed to be an 
absolutely fundamental property, it cannot (if the non-naturalist’s position is right) be that the 
action a and/or the property of being happiness-maximizing (either singly or jointly) stand in any 
fundamentality-inducing relation to moral rightness. Thus, if an opaque grounding claim of this 
sort is correct, CONSTITUENCY is false. 
3.2.2. Upshots 
Whether CONSTITUENCY is true or false might seem like a narrow and specific issue, but the 
preceding discussion has a number of noteworthy consequences. The first one is that if there are 
the relevant kind of opaque grounding cases, this means that there can be non-fundamental 
instantiations of fundamental properties. As we have seen, the non-naturalist takes the property 
of being morally right to be absolutely fundamental, but holds that [a is happiness-maximizing] 
fully grounds [a is morally right]. Since grounding induces relative fundamentality (and logically 
atomic facts are simply instantiations of properties or relations), this amounts to recognizing a 
non-fundamental instantiation (namely the grounded fact [a is morally right]) of the fundamental 
property of moral rightness. Though the discussion in recent metaphysics has been more 
concerned with the possibility (or otherwise) of non-fundamental entities being involved in 
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fundamental facts, it is an interesting question too whether there can be non-fundamental 
instantiations of fundamental properties.19 
Secondly, the preceding has consequences downstream for the relation between fundamentality 
and modality. It is a popular idea in metaphysics that fundamental entities should be freely 
modally recombinable: since all fundamental entities are wholly independent of each other, any 
possible way for one fundamental entity to be should be compossible with all the ways every other 
fundamental entity could be.20 But if there are opaque grounding cases of the sort described above, 
they provide striking counterexamples to this idea. Suppose that any fact of the form [x is morally 
right] must be opaquely grounded in a fact of the form [x is happiness-maximizing] (i.e. being 
happiness-maximizing is the one and only possible right-making property).21 Then, despite being 
an absolutely fundamental property, moral rightness is not modally free relative to other 
absolutely fundamental properties. For it is not free to be instantiated in an action without being 
co-instantiated with whatever fundamental properties ultimately ground an action’s being 
happiness-maximizing – it simply cannot come apart from those properties. Indeed, if – as seems 
plausible – being happiness-maximizing (or whatever property turns out to play the right-making 
role) is not a fundamental natural property (which seems plausible), the fundamental property of 
moral rightness will even be modally constrained by a less fundamental property (in addition to 
 
19 Much interest in the question of non-fundamental entities in fundamental facts traces back to the “Purity” 
principle of Sider (2011, 106). (It should be noted that Sider’s own discussion of these issues is not framed in 
terms of grounding, though much of the subsequent discussion has been.)  
20 Thus e.g. Schaffer (2010, 40) writes that ”If entities are metaphysically independent, then they should be 
modally unconstrained in combination”, and Bennett (2017, 190) writes that “The claim is therefore 
compelling: there is no reason to deny that fundamental (independent) entities are freely recombinable.” 
Although these claims are sometimes hedged so as to only apply to fundamental concrete objects (Schaffer) 
and contingent fundamental entities (Bennett) respectively, I think the general motivation for the view 
extends more widely. 
21 It is generally agreed that moral (and other normative) properties cannot be instantiated brutely. The 
question is thus rather whether there is just one possible right-making property, or several. 
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being constrained by the fundamental natural properties that ultimately ground being happiness-
maximizing)!22 
A possible reaction to these upshots is to question an implicit presupposition of mine, namely that 
opaque grounding is itself a fundamentality-inducing relation. It might be thought mysterious 
how [a is happiness-maximizing]’s grounding [a is morally right] can render the latter fact less 
fundamental than the former when there is no constituent of the grounded fact that is any less 
fundamental than any constituent of the ground. But while it is certainly possible to hold that the 
typical connection between grounding and relative fundamentality breaks down in opaque cases, 
I prefer to resist this conclusion. The connections between metaphysical explanation and relative 
fundamentality are pervasive, and an explanation-based account of fundamentality offers the best 
hope of making sense of this phenomenon. And even opaque grounding relations constitute (or 
back) explanatory connections between facts. My preferred way of going is rather to draw some 
further distinctions within our theory of fundamentality to dissolve the supposed mystery. On an 
explanation-based account, patterns of relative fundamentality are explained by relations of 
metaphysical explanation. But explanation is a very fine-grained phenomenon, and it is important 
to attend to precisely what the explanandum of the relevant metaphysical explanation is. When 
particles a1-aN compose the badger Bo, this licenses an explanation of Bo’s existence, why he is an 
entity at all (rather than non-existent). But when [a is happiness-maximizing] opaquely grounds 
[a is morally right], what gets explained is why the fact obtains (as opposed to not obtaining).23 
We can recognize this difference in the explanatory target at the level of fundamentality, by saying 
that the particles a1-aN are ontically more fundamental than Bo the badger, while [a is happiness-
 
22 Wang (2016) provides an extended critical discussion of the idea that fundamental entities are modally 
free of one another. None of her reasons for being suspicious of the idea relate to anything like opaque 
grounding, however. 
23 Note that since explanation is a hyperintensional phenomenon, it might be that some x explains the 
obtaining of a fact [P] without also explaining the existence of [P], even if facts must necessarily obtain to 
exist. (And on an approach to facts like mine, where atomic facts are instantiations of properties or relations, 
it makes the most sense to suppose that only obtaining facts exist.) 
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maximizing] is alethically more fundamental than [a is morally right] (on the opaque account), 
but not ontically more fundamental.24 Having drawn this distinction, we can reconcile the view 
that grounding is always fundamentality-inducing with the feeling that there is something quite 
different about [a is happiness-maximizing]’s being more fundamental than [a is morally right] as 
compared to the particles a1-aN’s being more fundamental than the badger Bo that they compose. 
4. Objections 
In this section, I will briefly discuss some objections to the idea of opaque grounding. But there 
are certain kinds of objections I will not deal with here. Firstly, I will not be concerned with general 
skepticism about grounding.25 I am happy to concede that if you have good reason to do away with 
grounding generally, this article is of little interest to you. Secondly, I will not deal with objections 
to the specifics of various substantive theories incorporating opaque grounding claims (such as 
e.g. moral non-naturalism, opaque property dualism about the mental, etc.). Arguably, there 
would be reason to believe the idea of opaque grounding to be fruitless and uninteresting if one 
had good reasons to reject all the theories committed to opaque grounding claims. But many of 
the objections to the theories in question will have nothing to do with opaque grounding as such.26 
In what follows I will instead be considering objections to very idea of opaque grounding. 
First, according to some philosophers, normative grounding is distinct from metaphysical 
grounding.27 If they are right, moral non-naturalism would involve normative grounding, and 
nothing could be concluded about the behavior of metaphysical grounding from consideration of 
such cases. This might lead one to think that the opaque grounding relation I’ve drawn attention 
 
24 I take it that the obtaining of a fact is sufficiently like the truth of a proposition to allow for extending the 
term “alethic” to cover it. 
25 For examples of general skepticism about grounding, see Hofweber (2009) and Daly (2012). 
26 Thus e.g. moral non-naturalism is often charged with being committed to objectionably metaphysically 
“queer” facts and properties. Even if this is a strong objection to moral non-naturalism, it does nothing to 
show that there is anything problematic about the idea that moral facts would be opaquely grounded in 
natural facts. For a discussion of the queerness argument, see Olson (2014, 79–138). 
27 See e.g. Fine (2012), Litland (2018). 
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to is not of any concern to metaphysics. I reject that. For what it’s worth, I am skeptical that 
normative grounding is distinct from metaphysical grounding.28 But even if it is, there are non-
normative cases of opaque grounding one can rely on instead. Recall e.g. that I mentioned in 
section 2 the possibility of defending a dualist view about the relation between the physical and 
the mental which involves an opaque grounding claim. Such a claim would clearly not concern 
normative grounding. There is more to say on the interesting issue of grounding pluralism, but for 
present purposes it will have to suffice to note that even grounding pluralists should pay attention 
to opaque grounding. 
One further line of resistance to opaque grounding might stem from the idea that it is part of the 
very concept of grounding that grounds are always involved in the metaphysical analysis or 
essence of what they ground. If this is true, whatever explanatory notion is involved in the alleged 
cases of opaque grounding would have to be distinct from grounding. There are at least two things 
to say in response. Firstly: even though many philosophers seem to assume that grounding is 
always transparent, there are also influential treatments of grounding in the literature which 
question that assumption or simply leave the issue open.29 While such treatments may yet turn 
out to be mistaken on substantive grounds, there is no obvious reason to take them to be 
conceptually incoherent. Secondly: even if the extant concept of grounding did in fact turn out to 
include a requirement that grounding always be transparent, that would not necessarily show 
anything about which metaphysical relations there are or which of them hold. Perhaps the current 
concept of grounding should be revised or replaced in order to capture a more theoretically fruitful 
 
28 See e.g. Berker (2017). Lange (2018) provides an argument against the view that normative necessity is 
weaker than metaphysical necessity, thus undermining the obvious way of distinguishing normative 
grounding from metaphysical grounding. 
29 See e.g. Rosen (2010, 133) on “Moorean connections”; Schaffer (2016b, 83) writes “I should also flag that 
my treatment of grounding has not once mentioned a concept often thought central, namely that of essence 




and interesting relation. Either way, a mere appeal to concepts does not seem to settle any 
important metaphysical issue here. 
A further possible worry is that once we sever any necessary connection between grounding and 
relations like metaphysical analysis or essential involvement, it is hard to see what distinguishes 
grounding from mere metaphysical necessitation. The question arises: if the grounds of a fact need 
not be part of the metaphysical analysis or essence of the fact, can we make sense of how grounding 
differs from merely modal connections? I think we can. The worry presupposes that the distinction 
only makes sense if grounding is necessarily transparent. But there is no clear reason to accept 
that. Firstly, we do not need to move beyond the uncontroversial platitudes about grounding to be 
able to distinguish it from modal phenomena. Grounding is crucially different from mere 
metaphysical necessitation by being a hyperintensional relation that necessarily connects to 
explanatory notions expressed by (inter alia) “in virtue of”, “because” and “due to” talk. Secondly, 
there are already treatments of grounding on the market that distinguish it from necessitation 
without relying on notions of essence or metaphysical analysis to do so.30 Proponents of opaque 
grounding are free to help themselves to any of these treatments or to develop entirely new ones. 
The worry is unfounded. 
Thus, none of the objections to opaque grounding discussed here seem forceful. While this does 
not conclusively show that there is opaque grounding in the world, there is no reason at this point 
to exclude the notion from our metaphysical theorizing. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have introduced and spelled out the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding. 
I have argued that there are some widespread philosophical theories (such as classical moral non-
 
30 Thus e.g. Schaffer (2016b), Wilson (2018a; 2018b) attempt to illuminate grounding by highlighting its 
many similarities to causation, and by developing a framework of structural equation models for grounding 
claims. None of these treatments makes appeal to the ideology of essence, metaphysical analysis or anything 
of the like. Schaffer (2016a) further discusses how a treatment of this sort can help dispel methodological 
worries about grounding. 
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naturalism) that are plausibly taken to be committed to opaque grounding claims. I have 
furthermore drawn attention to some important consequences the idea of opaque grounding has 
for our theorizing about grounding and nearby topics, and consequently why that idea is of 
interest. Finally, I have defended the notion from some general objections aimed at questioning 
its legitimacy and usefulness.  
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